cutting red tape for the response in the field in the panhandle. The response for the peninsula (panhandle was under the New Orleans group) was at St Pete where USCG is effectively co-located with FWRI (FWC) and NOAA/NMFS, as well as USF's big research vessel that was tracking oil movement. So it was mostly a very well staffed, fairly calm, and coordinated planning exercise interrupted by BP contractors acting like morons...until they learned that we could get them whatever they needed in terms of data and local cooperation. Regional/National agency leadership kept trying to send us people from Alaska to tell us how to do stuff. I fended that off and convinced them not to send anyone I didn't ask for. I had been a part of 3 major spill responses years before in Texas, and FWRI and USF folks knew enough about the gulf currents to know we weren't in any real danger of significant problems. Nevertheless we spent the early days writing a contingency plan for the peninsula; and they still use it...so not a waste. Pressure was working almost 24/7 for weeks and weeks with FWC leadership in Tally who was dealing with the panhandle and the New Orleans group (which did have Alaska federal folks who were burning every bridge they came across...I got one of them sent home). My shop in FL was over sea turtles, manatees, and a few dozen other listed species for the agency. So the species experts they were using in the response were almost exclusively my staff. Sea turtles were a headliner in the response. So we were integral in setting up the hatchery at Merritt Island/KSC and making sure FWC could staff out what they needed to in terms of handling fed trust stuff. BP's demands of our experts was literally abusive. We had no backups in terms of expertise so we were quickly educated how to record our time. I never rotated out and my turtle and manatee leads never rotated out. Not the healthiest decision but there literally wasn't anyone else who could cover those jobs. I approved the decision to release the hatchlings in the Atlantic rather than the Gulf and since that had never been tried, and there would never be any data to show one way or the other, we didn't credit BP with saving any of them. I don't know if BP ever got that assumption overturned; I'm sure they tried. Politically, large spills probably have to be federalized. No President is ever going on TV to say; "well we're keeping a eye on things, but you know, I'm sure they'll do a good job". But if at all possible, that should always be a last resort. Federalizing a response puts the responsible party in a position of leverage over the federal agencies...until the last penny is spent years and years later. We quickly learned that lesson in Texas so two of our large spills were not federalized. That puts the onus on the spiller to account for everything and come up with remediation plans/measures. And that is a FAR better and more effective position to be in and the money gets spent where it needs to be spent years faster. ** Edited by daveinop at 4/18/2024, 9:12:43 AM