The issue here is the engineering testing of the ACS was incorrect. Competent folks would have caught the screw up before it occurred. 50 yrs ago, competency wasn't the issue we have today. A matter of analyzing the duty cycle in testing vs simulated mission duty cycle. Now 40ish years ago, we launched Challenger knowing the o rings were outside environment spec. Another, let's ignore the engineers saying..."wait a minute, this is risky". And the shuttle was lost. Further, recall the change in color of the external tank (white to brownish). That was a well intended nod to environmental sensitivity. Trouble was, it shedded foam on way up. Seen over and over. And the risk was "accepted"...and Columbia was lost. Nothings perfect and engineering development takes time and has hiccups. ** Edited by ColoVT82 at 8/25/2024, 8:43:59 PM